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Money and the International
Monetary System
AM VERY HONORED to have been invited to
deliver the annual Homer Jones memorial lec-
ture. In deference to his memory, I believe it is
appropriate that this lecture be concerned with
some of the enduring themes that pervade
thinking about money.
Many distinguished economists have pondered
the role of money and prices and the question
of whether it is more appropriate to organize
our monetary affairs along national lines or to
adhere to an international monetary standard.
In arriving at an answer, they have addressed
important aspects of freedom, liberty and
sovereignty.
That the debate is still not settled definitively
attests to the complexity of the topic. As a mat-
ter of fact, the current debate about the desir-
ability of a common European monetary stan-
dard and about the formation of a European
central bank has revived many of the old
arguments.
My central theme today will be the role of
money and monetary stability and the choice
between a national monetary standard and an
international one.
I have a personal reason for choosing this
topic. For many years it has troubled me that
some of my friends and colleagues view them-
selves as monetarists and analyze domestic
policy from that perspective, while another
group of my friends maintains that fixed ex-
change rates are the glue that holds the world
economy together. From the perspective of that
group, the world would be a better place if we
would only adopt a gold standard.
This division reminds me of the time when I
set out on my first trip to Latin America. As I
was leaving, an expert on the region told me:
“Young man, as you travel from country to
country in Latin America, you cannot fail to
notice that half of the central bankers you en-
counter will advocate fixed exchange rates,
while the other half see flexible exchange rates
as the only solution to their country’s problems.
Pretty soon you will also learn that virtually all
of them attended the University of Chicago. As
far as I can tell, the only reason for their dif-
ferent convictions is that the first group studied
in Chicago in a year when Harry Johnson and
Robert Mundell taught the Monetary Workshop,
while the second group took the course in a
year when Milton Friedman was teaching it.”
Eventually, I learned that the views of the two
groups could be reconciled on the global level
because there the conceptual and behavioral
assumptions underlying the two approaches
converge. If there were only one world econom-
ic and financial system, the debate about fixed
versus flexible exchange rates would not have
been joined in the first place. Unfortunately,
that is not the world we live in.
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But even for the world we live in, there is a
surprisingly close association among the global
level of international reserves (or the global
monetary base), the world money supply and
the world price level. That finding, however,
does not answer the question of whether finan-
cial stability is best achieved by having individu-
al nations manage their own monetary affairs in
an independent, decentralized manner; by rely-
ing on a global monetary constraint to impose
monetary discipline; or by seeking a workable
compromise that we can all live with.
Clearly, I will not be able to do justice to all
the complexities and nuances of the topic in
such a limited span of time. Brevity may, how-
ever, allow me to bring some of the issues
sharply into focus and to crystallize some of the
arguments.
I will first consider the roles of money in the
economy and then discuss some of the prob-
lems of defining monetary stability. I will then
turn to the role of freedom in determining the
ideal monetary system and finally present the
rudiments of a workable monetary system that
represents a viable compromise for our im-
perfect world.
THE ROLES OF MONEY
Money enhances economic freedom. In the
absence of money, we would still be free to
make choices, but these choices would be cost-
ly, cumbersome and constrained.
To see how money enhances economic free-
dom, it is useful to remind ourselves that
money fulfills several distinct roles: it serves as
a unit of account, a medium of exchange and a
store of value.
As a unit of account, money enhances free-
dom of choice by permitting price comparisons
to be made more readily. It lowers information
costs and thereby improves the choices available.
As a medium of exchange, money allows in-
dividuals to better exercise their freedom to ac-
quire goods and services by lowering transac-
tion costs. Without money, people could barter
but this process would certainly be troublesome
and expensive.
As a store of value, money permits people to
exercise intertemporal choices by allowing them
to accumulate funds and to spend them later.
One may even argue that money increases
political freedom. Not only does money offer
greater independence and freedom of decision
making, but as a generally acceptable means of
payment and store of value, it enables the in-
dividual to reject one political system and use
his life savings to live somewhere else, under a
different political regime.
Thus, it is not surprising that politically re-
pressive regimes tend to provide their citizens
with a money that has little or no international
acceptability. Furthermore, they tend to punish
those who try to enhance their freedom of
choice and scope for independence by accumu-
lating foreign currencies, Nor is it surprising
that often, in times of extreme political suppres-
sion, gold has become an increasingly valuable
treasure.
MONEY AND THE PRICE LEVEL
Money can fill these various roles in an op-
timal fashion only if it is a stable unit of ac-
count, a stable means of exchange, and a stable
store of value. In other words, money should
provide a consistent yardstick, and that can be
true only in a non-inflationary environment.
Unfortunately, the measurement of inflation
itself poses not only conceptual, but also prac-
tical problems. If money itself is the yardstick,
how can its value be defined in terms of some-
thing else? If the monetary unit, say the dollar,
were to be defined in terms of gold, isn’t gold
then the yardstick? In that case, gold will at
least perform as the unit of account while the
dollar may serve as the means of exchange and
the store of value.
The value of a national currency may also be
defined or measured in terms of other national
currencies. But obviously this definition cannot
be used for all currencies: The “last” currency
must be defined in terms of something else.
There must be an ultimate yardstick. The Bret-
ton Woods system solved this problem by defin-
ing the value of all currencies in terms of the
dollar, and defining the dollar in terms of gold.
Within a country, the price level is typically
the measuring rod for the value of its currency.
However, the definition of the price level is not
as unambiguous as it may seem at first sight.
Most customary measures of the price level
have the disadvantage of relying on weighted
averages of transaction prices of current goods
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and services. These are the familiar GNP deflat-
ors and the indices of producer prices and con-
sumer prices. For instance, as a measure of the
value of the stock of money, the GNP deflator is
flawed. It is a concept that has meaning only
for the prices of goods that are produced dur-
ing a certain period — that is, a flow concept.
But how about the prices of assets such as
commodities and real estate? Aren’t they rele-
vant when it comes to judging whether we are
in an inflationary or a deflationary situation? It
is arguably more appropriate to measure the
value of money in terms of other assets because
money itself is an asset. While a good case can
be made for considering prices of tangible
assets in assessing the value of money, matters
become increasingly complex as we broaden the
spectrum to include financial assets. One may
also make a good case that stock prices are a
convenient proxy for real asset values. But
other influences, such as a change in manage-
ment or changes in tax-law, may also influence
the value of a stock.
Matters become even more complicated in the
case of bonds. While they are an asset on one
individual’s balance sheet, they are a liability on
someone else’s balance sheet. Their value is also
directly influenced by monetary policy, and it is
easy to get into circular reasoning in that con-
nection. Although bond prices do give useful in-
formation, it is probably better to consider that
information separately from information con-
veyed by changes in real asset prices.
I conclude from this discussion that if we are
interested in the stability of money as a unit of
account, store of value and means of transac-
tion, the appropriate indices for changes in the
value of money should incorporate prices that
reflect these functions. That is, asset prices,
commodity prices and intermediate as well as
final goods prices might appropriately be given
attention in defining and measuring price
stability and the value of money.
GOLD AS A MONETARY
STANDARD
Given the complexities of measuring the price
level itself and of defining the value of money,
it is not surprising that over the centuries peo-
plc, in seeking simplicity and expediency, have
focused on gold as a universal constant that
served as a practical unit of account, a medium
of exchange and a store of value.
Gold has served as money over centuries of
human history.’ Moreover, many distinguished
economists have advocated a gold standard at
some point in their professional lives. But many
of them have subsequently abandoned their
beliefs that gold can serve as a national, let
alone a global, money and have come to ad-
vocate alternative systems.
I argued earlier that money plays an impor-
tant role in maintaining and enhancing econom-
ic and political freedom. To my mind, gold fails
to meet this crucial test for a monetary stan-
dard. The two largest gold-producing countries
in the world are the Soviet Union and South
Africa; as key suppliers, they wield considerable
influence over the market price of gold.
I view neither one as an economically or
politically reliable and stable supplier. Thus, I
would not entrust them with the power over
our economic, financial and, indeed, political af-
fairs that a move to a gold standard would en-
tail. This objection seems to me so fundamental
as to make further debate of the pros and cons
of a gold standard unproductive and pointless.
There is simply no reason why free, democratic
nations should cede such an important part of
their sovereignty into uncertain hands. Of
course, everyone should be free to choose to
hold gold, and to use it as a store of value or as
a medium of exchange between willing in-
dividuals. Governments should neither fix the
price of gold nor impede its private use.
FREEDOM AND THE MONETARY
SYSTEM
Choosing an international monetary system in-
volves profound constitutional questions that af-
fect a nation’s sovereignty.
The deep desire to protect and foster human
freedom unites the advocates of a national
monetary rule and the proponents of an overar-
ching international monetary standard. For
simplicity’s sake, I will refer to them as the
II will avoid the interesting debate on silver and bimetallism
and concentrate simply on gold.
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monetarists and the internationalists. The two
groups also distinguish themselves in their ad-
vocacy of flexible and fixed exchange rates
respectively.
Both the monetarists and the internationalists
hold the view that government should serve the
people and that the role of government should
be strictly limited. In the economic realm, both
groups believe in price stability as the key ob-
jective of monetary policy. They also want to
limit the role of government, and therefore ad-
vocate the adoption of “monetary constitutions”
or predetermined rules for carrying out policy.
In that, they are united against the interven-
tionist view, which holds that active governmen-
tal decision making is a positive force that is
needed to bring about economic stability, effi-
ciency and welfare maximization.
But the monetarists and the internationalists
adhere to different philosophical concepts about
which monetary arrangements best protect
human freedom. The monetarists believe that
human freedom is protected best when govern-
mental authority is exercised at the most decen-
tralized level of government; the interna-
tionalists believe that a global monetary rule
would minimize the chance of inappropriate in-
terference by national governments by taking
monetary decision making out of their hands.
Thus, monetarists and internationalists tend to
differ in their prescriptions for organizing the
monetary system. In addition, different em-
pirical judgments about the way the world
works underlie the two approaches.
Monetarists argue that to preserve individual
freedom, the power of the state should be
limited. They claim that the only consistent way
to accomplish this objective is to disperse
governmental power through decentralization to
the lowest level possible. National government
should exercise only those powers that cannot
be delegated to regional or local governmental
units.
While monetarists believe that the power to
create money and regulate its value should be
exercised at the national level, they also believe
that the authorities should be constrained by a
domestic monetary growth rule.
From this belief it follows that the govern-
ment should not be externally constrained. For
the monetarists, preserving that independence is
a key requirement of any international mone-
tary system. Consequently, the international
monetary system should be constructed so that
monetary decisions are taken at the lowest level
of decentralization possible, namely, the nation.
Flexible exchange rates are therefore advocated
by the monetarists as a means of preserving the
political and economic independence of the
country. Under such a system, international
policy coordination is not only unnecessary, it is
even undesirable because it will inevitably in-
fringe upon the freedom of the nation-state. In-
stead, flexible exchange rates are advocated as a
buffer between countries.
In contrast, internationalists argue that in-
dividual economic freedom can be attained best
in a system in which one common international
currency is used throughout the world. In such
a system, individuals are free from national
economic and financial constraints and can max-
imize their welfare unhampered by national
boundaries and political intrusions. They are at
liberty to engage in transactions with anybody
anywhere in the world. In the view of many in-
ternationalists, an international gold standard
provides such a system, in which gold serves as
the actual medium of exchange. Such a system
eliminates the uncertainties imposed by fluctua-
tions in exchange rates, and maximization of
global welfare therefore becomes a genuine
possibility.
The true internationalist sees the nation-state
largely as a political construct that has only
limited economic importance. A common global
monetary standard will allow individuals to
maximize their economic as well as their politi-
cal welfare.
The two sides are united in their view that
the preservation and enhancement of individual
freedom are the ultimate and overarching goals
of any social order. That is the ideal. They both
wish to attain that ideal by minimizing the
political and economic power of the state. Fur-
thermore, they assume that competitive forces
will bring about economic adjustment in a
speedy and efficient manner.
The question is whether reality can approach
this ideal view of the world, or whether the im-
perfections that still beset the world call for a
compromise that may fall short of the ideal




While at present important interpreting forces
are shaping the global economy, I believe that
the world is still an imperfect place. Economic
conditions and the degree of economic integra-
tion vary around the globe. Relatively few true
global markets exist, and the various national
and regional markets are linked with differing
degrees of perfection.
In other words, despite greater globalization
the economic and financial world remains a
patchwork. Some would argue that patchwork
makes the world even more interesting and
beautiful — and in a world with positive infor-
mation costs, the one may be just as efficient as
the other.
The problem confronting us is therefore one
of constrained optimization and of the develop-
ment of rules that will permit maximum free-
dom in the economic and political realm while
taking into account the need for collective deci-
sion making in certain areas.
Nowhere is the need for such an accommoda-
tion more apparent than in the monetary
sphere. Just as separate monies issued by in-
dividual persons would lose their usefulness, so
would a global monetary standard not necessari-
ly serve everyone best. The debate about the
advantages and disadvantages associated with a
common monetary standard and a central bank
for Europe reveals the problems and the issues
involved.
Let me set out what I consider to be some
relevant considerations that should guide us in
deciding what monetary system will serve us
best.
First of all, the goal of monetary policy should
be to provide a stable financial environment so
that private decision makers can maximize their
welfare. A stable monetary standard will help to
minimize transaction costs and aid in rational
economic decision making. Stability in this sense
can be defined as the absence of any bias in
decision making that would be induced by a
tendency for the price level to vary systematic-
ally. This state of affairs will be reached when
the change in the general price level is close
enough to zero that economic agents can ignore
it in their decision making.
Second, price stability is meaningful only in
an economically and financially integrated area.
The world we live in does not yet represent
such a market area. National borders, artificial
or informal barriers to economic and financial
flows, information barriers and the like, all con-
tribute to a compartmentalization of the world
economy.
Third, a common indicator, such as a global
commodity basket, can provide a useful refer-
ence point for national and international policy
makers. Not only is such a reference point
helpful in introducing sensitive asset prices into
the decision making process, but also it gives
important information about the development of
global inflationary or deflationary pressures. In-
deed, the use of such an indicator of commodi-
ty prices was agreed upon at the Toronto sum-
mit meeting of the industrialized nations.
Fourth, more or less homogeneous economic
and financial zones constitute the optimal do-
mains for various monies or monetary stan-
dards. As economic and financial integration
progresses and as the barriers between econom-
ic regions fall, the natural monetary domain
also grows. At present, such progress is par-
ticularly pronounced in Europe, which is rapid-
ly moving toward becoming an integrated
economic and financial entity. As a conse-
quence, talk about European monetary integra-
tion nowadays is more than theoretical specula-
tion, and it may well move into the realm of
reality in the not too distant future.
Fifth, it should be recognized that monetary
integration has not only economic, but also
political significance. The road to this common
monetary standard can be the formation of a
joint political decision-making body, the delega-
tion of the monetary decisions to a common
central bank, adoption of a commodity or gold
standard or the formal or informal acceptance
of a standard represented by another monetary
authority. In the last case, the political under-
pinnings of that decision-making body must be
sufficiently similar to the political beliefs and
priorities of all participants to avert substantive
conflicts.
As the global integration of economic and
financial markets proceeds and as political in-
terdependence increases, it stands to reason
that monetary integration will increase as well.
In that connection it is important that pro-
gress in one area be accompanied by progress
in the other areas. Just as it would be unrealis-
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tic to expect rapid political integration, it is
unrealistic to push monetary integration too far
out in front. Time for adjustment and consen-
sus formation must be permitted.
But as confidence in economic and financial
integration grows and as political cooperation
becomes an enduring reality, progress toward
greater monetary integration will be made as
well. That is, the monetary domains will tend to
expand, and over time we will move closer to a
global monetary standard.
What does all that imply for the real world
that we live in?
In exploring that question, we must remem-
ber the lessons of history. Soon after the
establishment of a government for the United
States, the First Bank of the United States was
founded, in 1789. Its charter was not renewed,
and it was succeeded by the Second Bank of the
United States, which ceased to exist in 1836.
Why? Simply because the economic and political
consensus in the young nation was too weak to
support a uniform monetary policy. The in-
terests of the merchants and traders of the East
could not yet be reconciled with the priorities
of the farmers and settlers of the South and
West. Thus, the United States had to do without
a central bank until the formation of the Federal
Reserve System, only 75 years ago. Even then,
the design of the System recognized the need to
assure representation of the views of the vari-
ous regions of the country, as well as those of
the banking, commercial, industrial, agricultural
and public interests.
On our own continent, we see an ever-
increasing integration of the economic and
financial affairs of the United states and Canada.
The U.S. dollar is used widely in Canadian
capital markets. It is also used as a medium of
exchange and a store of value in much of Latin
America. But clearly no political base is in place
for monetary integration among the various coun-
tries of the American continent.
Matters have proceeded further in Europe,
where the movement toward economic integra-
tion has been accompanied by the establishment
of common administrative and political institu-
tions. This development sets the stage for the
debate about the desirability of establishing a
central bank for Europe, which could issue a
common currency and administer a common
monetary policy.
It is instructive to trace the development of
the European Community because it illustrates
the interdependence of economic, monetary and
political integration. An economic beginning was
made by the original six signatories to the Trea-
ty of Rome, which established the European
Economic Community. Gradually, other nations
entered the economic union.
In the monetary sphere, Belgium and Luxem-
bourg have long had a common currency. The
common monetary arrangements of the Euro-
pean “snake” constituted essentially an experi-
ment, but taught important lessons that were
incorporated into the more formal European
Monetary System. While the original members
of the European Economic Community are now
all participants in the European Monetary
System, some of the countries that joined the
Community later have not yet taken this step.
Overall, progress has been gradual and some-
times marked by disappointments and setbacks.
All this has been accompanied by the establish-
ment of common European political institutions
and by the development of an administrative ap-
paratus that has progressed from exercising
coordinating functions to playing an important
decision-making role. Thus, a growing economic
and political consensus has been forged that
may in due course serve as a foundation for a
common European currency and a common
monetary policy.
I have previously advocated the establishment
of unitary exchange rates as an intermediate
step that the Europeans might take. Under such
an arrangement, all exchange rates would be
aligned so that one German mark would equal
one French franc, one British Pound, and so on.
The institutional arrangements of the current
European Monetary System (EMS) would be
maintained. Under such a scheme, the various
currencies would soon be accepted across the
continent, and in effect a uniform means of ex-
change for the continent would be created. If
the arrangement were successful, a full
monetary union and European central bank
might follow in due course.
The formation of a European currency area
would undoubtedly have implications that
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would transcend European borders. Already
quite a few African countries peg their curren-
cies to those of European countries, and it can
be expected that these and possibly others
would want to peg to a common European cur-
rency as well.
What may we conclude from this discussion?
One, the choice of a monetary standard and a
monetary system involves important political
choices and is rooted in basic ideas about how
best to protect and preserve freedom. Those
choices, then, must be made with great care.
A certain congruence among political, econom-
ic, financial and monetary arrangements is
needed if such arrangements are to find public
acceptance and if they are to be viable.
Two, as the world becomes more integrated,
progress toward the establishment of broader
monetary domains can also be made.
I believe that we are privileged to live in a
time in which we are witness to considerable
progress on all these fronts and in which we
can participate in building a more integrated
world, where economic and political decisions
can be made with increasing freedom for all
people.
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